The interaction effect of independent boards on corporate governance-corporate social responsibility (CG-CSR) and performance nexus by Ismail, Rusmawati et al.
Asian Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, 61–84, 2020
© Asian Academy of Management and Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2020. This work is 
licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/).
THE INTERACTION EFFECT OF INDEPENDENT BOARDS 
ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-CORPORATE SOCIAL  
RESPONSIBILITY (CG-CSR) AND PERFORMANCE NEXUS
Sitara Karim*, Norlida Abdul Manab, and Rusmawati Ismail
School of Economics, Finance and Banking, College of Business,  
Universiti Utara Malaysia, 06010 Sintok, Kedah, Malaysia
*Corresponding author: sitarakarim.malik@gmail.com
Published online: 30 June 2020
To cite this article: Karim, S., Abdul Manab, N., & Ismail, R. (2020). The interaction 
effect of independent boards on corporate governance-corporate social responsibility (CG-
CSR) and performance nexus. Asian Academy of Management Journal, 25(1), 61–84. 
https://doi.org/10.21315/aamj2020.25.1.4
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.21315/aamj2020.25.1.4
ABSTRACT 
The financial crises over the past two decades were identified as the main reason for the 
economic collapse. Malaysia suffered the same fate when many organisations crumpled 
from inappropriate compliance of governance mechanisms and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosure practices. Given this condition, this study intends to 
examine the effects of governance mechanisms and CSR practice on firm performance and 
the moderating effect of board independence is investigated on corporate governance-CSR 
(CG-CSR) and performance nexus of 588 Malaysian companies listed on Bursa Malaysia 
between 2006 and 2017. Both accounting-based (ROA) and market-based (Tobin’s Q) 
performance measures have been used for measuring performance. Dynamic model using 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) has been employed on the dataset to control 
for potential endogeneity, reverse causality, and dynamic heterogeneity. Findings indicate 
that ownership concentration negatively affects ROA; chief executive officer (CEO) duality 
positively affects ROA and negatively affects Tobin’s Q. Moreover, investment on CSR is 
negatively related to both performance measures. Finally, board independence negatively 
moderates the CG mechanisms, CSR practice, and performance relationship. Findings of 
the study have implications for Bursa Malaysia and Securities Commission Malaysia to 
reset the limit of independent directors on board so that their unnecessary interference 
in operations of management may be avoided. Furthermore, companies need to reassess 
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their CSR strategies whether they are spending on CSR activities or hiding their financial 
malfeasance in the name of investment on CSR. 
Keywords: board independence, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, 
firm performance, Malaysia
INTRODUCTION 
While the interest in corporate governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) is increasing, recent research has provided unclear and mixed results about 
their relationships. These relationships are examined in accordance with the agency 
theory and the stakeholder’s theory in which each theory interprets the relationship 
between CG and CSR differently. According to Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder’s 
theory, and in addition to effective CG mechanisms, CSR must be used as an 
extension to resolve conflicts between managers and non-investing stakeholders. 
On the other hand, supporters of the agency theory argue that CSR is costly to 
the firm and managers tend to hide their failure or unfavourable performance by 
overinvesting in CSR activities thus breaching the CG’s overinvestment prevention. 
Such practices do not maximise the firm’s value, thus CSR is viewed as a waste of 
resources with a negative impact on CG (Barnea & Rubin, 2010).
However, CG and CSR might be considered complementary to each other. Firms 
prove to survive without CSR engagement but suffer with the absence of CG 
practices. Jensen (2002) believes that CSR and CG are both indicators of the 
firm’s fiduciary and moral commitments towards stakeholders, and he proposed 
the “enlightened stakeholder theory” by including the social responsibility aspects 
in the shareholder wealth maximisation. Based on an extensive literature review, 
Jamali et al. (2008) suggest that there is considerable overlap between CG and 
CSR. This overlap may be in the CG-CSR one way relationship part, since strong 
CG practices would result in CSR engagement. Accordingly, it is important to 
mention that CSR is not solely related to the social behaviour of the firm, but 
also to the marketplace, environment, and workplace (Karim et al., 2019a). Given 
this stance, another important element is the issue of skills gap and inadequate 
knowledge management strategies adopted by the board of directors (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003). Since Malaysia has been continuously striving to ensure effective 
governance practices while highlighting the role of efficient board of directors in 
the company but still there are discrepancies in compliance of CG codes by the 
listed firms in Malaysia that necessitate this study. 
Additionally, Bursa Malaysia in its Corporate Governance Code (2017) has set 
the limit of more than a 50% representation of independent directors on board. 
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In this way, many enhancements are needed in CG structures where board of 
directors may better monitor the firm. Moreover, weak compliance of CG codes, 
elevated agency issues between managers and shareholders, financial malfeasance, 
and inappropriate disclosure practices of Malaysian listed firms bring the issue to 
the limelight. Hence, this study is unique in investigating the interaction effect of 
independent board of directors on CG-CSR and performance relationship. 
Based on the above arguments, there are two objectives of this study:
1. To examine the combined impact of CG mechanisms and CSR practice on 
firm performance in Malaysian listed companies
2. To investigate the moderating effects of board independence on CG-CSR 
and performance nexus 
CG mechanisms examined in the study are ownership concentration, managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership, and chief executive officer (CEO) duality; 
whereas CSR practice investigated in this research is investment on CSR. In this 
way, the chief results of the study indicate ownership concentration to be negatively 
related to return on assets (ROA), CEO duality is positively linked to ROA whereas 
negatively associated with Tobin’s Q. Moreover, investment on CSR is negatively 
related to both performance measures. As far as board independence is concerned, 
the presence of independent directors on the board negatively moderates the 
CG-CSR and performance relationship. The findings have novel implications 
for policy makers and regulatory authorities of Malaysia to assess the combined 
effect of CG mechanisms and CSR practice on performance of listed firms and 
to reduce the representation of the independent board of directors on the board 
to have their positive interaction effect on the given relationship. Moreover, for 
academia, this research is significant for uncovering new aspects of sustainable 
governance practices through different empirical and econometric approaches 
using the dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for analysis. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEwORK
Theories that contribute to the current study are agency theory and legitimacy 
theory. It is argued that the agency theory alone may not sufficiently inform CG-
CSR and performance nexus in diverse contexts and from diverse perspectives. 
A multi-theoretic approach to CG research is essential for recognising the 
many mechanisms and structures that might reasonably enhance organisational 
functioning. In this way, agency theory points to a potential conflict that may 
exist between the agent and the principal in an agency relationship. The policy 
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prescription resulting from this theory is usually a mechanism to align the interests 
of the agent, who is likely to act in her own best interest and the principal (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). According to this theory, there are two ways of aligning the 
interests of agents and those of the principals, i.e., the first is monitoring the agent’s 
behaviour to prevent him/her from engaging in opportunistic behaviour; and, the 
second is the provision of incentives and rewards for the agent to entice him/her 
into a behaviour that is aligned with the interest of the principal.
According to Liu and Taylor (2008) and Meyer and Rowan (1977), firms achieve 
corporate legitimacy when they adopt “proper organisational structures that 
comply with social norms and values.” Thus, according to this theory, firms have 
to manage their organisational structures to earn corporate legitimacy. If they 
fail to adapt “appropriate” organisational structures, stakeholders and resource 
providers may threaten to withdraw the resources needed for the firm to carry out 
its normal activities (Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000). In recent years, there has been 
an increasing focus on the structure and strategies adopted for ensuring effective 
CG mechanisms and CSR practices whereby the moderating effect of independent 
board of directors is examined as an added advantage for firms to maintain 
corporate legitimacy. Based on corporate legitimacy, it is posited that CG-CSR 
and firm performance relationship is likely to enhance corporate accountability, 
by providing a mechanism for independent oversight by independent boards of 
corporate activities, thus promoting corporate legitimacy. 
Apart from these theories, Harjoto and Jo (2011) used four most noteworthy and 
representative hypotheses to elaborate the CG-CSR and performance nexus. Four 
hypotheses chosen for the study are over-investment hypothesis (Barnea & Rubin, 
2010; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), strategic-choice hypothesis (Cespa & Cestone, 
2007), product-signaling/differentiation hypothesis (Fisman et al., 2006), and 
conflict resolution hypothesis (Scherer et al., 2006; Calton & Payne, 2003; Jensen, 
2002). Over-investment hypothesis (Barnea & Rubin, 2010) contends that firms 
tend to over-invest in CSR activities to hide their financial misconducts whereas 
strategic choice hypothesis argues that incumbent CEOs strategically choose CSR 
activities to generate support from social and environmental activities to reduce 
the probability of CEO turnover (Cespa & Cestone, 2007). Correspondingly, firms 
use CSR activities to signal their product quality, especially those that operate in 
highly competitive market (product-signaling/differentiation hypothesis). Finally, 
Calton and Payne (2003) and Scherer et al. (2006) believe that firms use CSR 
activities to reduce conflict of interest between managers, investing and non-
investing stakeholders (conflict-resolution hypothesis). For current study, support 
of various hypotheses has been taken for empirical justification. 
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LITERATURE REVIEw AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In the subsequent discussion, literature review of earlier empirical studies 
concerning CG mechanisms such as ownership concentration, managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership and CEO duality, and CSR practice, i.e., 
investment on CSR and its impact on firm performance is presented. Moreover, the 
interaction effect of board independence is also reviewed based on prior literature. 
Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance
Ownership concentration determines whether the ownership is scattered or 
limited to three to five owners. This may be referred to as block holder ownership 
where ownership is confined to three to five owners. Agency theory contends 
that agency conflicts occur between principals and agents because of widely 
dispersed ownership and the separation of shareholders and management (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). La Porta et al. (2000) described this concept as prospective 
cause of conflict of interest between major and minor shareholders. However, 
block holder ownership is considered as a way to decrease the conflict of interest 
between shareholders and management. Furthermore, agency theory is based on the 
rationale that there is a separation between management and ownership and due to 
this separation, problems of interest arise between the owners and managers as the 
opportunistic behaviour of the managers would jeopardise the owners’ interests 
(Lam & Lee, 2012). However, agency conflicts also occur between majority and 
minority shareholders as a result of concentrated shareholdings in the hands of few 
shareholders on account of other shareholders (AlQadasi & Abidin, 2018). 
Based on agency theory claims, it is hypothesised that:
H1: Ownership concentration is negatively related to firm performance
Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance
Managerial ownership defines the stake and proportion of shares held by the 
managers of firm (Mishra & Kapil, 2017). A common notion prevails that managers 
will work for the best interests of organisations when they have ownership in the 
firm (Alabdullah, 2018). Or else, a potential conflict of interest between managers 
and owners of the firm can be raised. The arguments of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
are noteworthy for explaining this phenomenon from incentive perspective and 
entrenchment perspective (Mitra et al., 2017). Incentive perspective, they claim, 
explains that managers take up different investment strategies that tend to reduce 
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the payment to outside suppliers of funds and it can only be possible when there is 
high level of managerial ownership within the firm (Alabdullah, 2018).    
Contrarily, entrenchment perspective contends high managerial ownership brings 
fewer chances for outsiders to interfere in the management affairs. Taking both 
perspectives simultaneously, the relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance seems non-linear (Shan, 2017). The agency issues between 
shareholders and management may encourage the managers to exert less effort to 
administrate the firm (Shan, 2017). Moreover, these issues may lead the managers 
to use available resources for their personal well-being. However, agency problem 
may be reduced if managers hold large fraction of the firm’s equity (Alabdullah, 
2018). Thus, an increase in proportion of shares owned by the managers may help 
to align the interest of managers and shareholders by restricting them not to waste 
the firm’s resources for their own well-being (Ofoeda, 2017; Mishra & Kapil, 
2017). Based on entrenchment perspective, it is hypothesised that: 
H2: Managerial ownership is negatively linked to firm performance 
Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance
Institutional investors have a very significant role in CG and they are concerned 
with reducing agency costs in the firms as they have both the motivation and 
intention to monitor the managers to safeguard their interest (Panda & Leepsa, 
2019; Mehdi et al., 2017). Moreover, they can directly participate in firm’s 
decision-making process by pressuring the board of directors and disciplining the 
management (Wang, 2016). Based on the monitoring role of institutional investors, 
Pound (1988) presented three hypotheses namely efficient monitoring, conflict of 
interest, and strategic alliance to explicate the relationship between firm value and 
institutional shareholdings where efficient monitoring hypothesis predicts that 
institutional investors can monitor the management more effectively than small 
investors. 
Contrarily, conflict of interest hypothesis suggest that institutional investors are 
forced to use their right to vote in favour of management on account of their other 
business relationships (Aluchna & Kaminski, 2017). However, strategic alignment 
hypothesis predict that managers and institutional investors may find it valuable 
to cooperate in the best interests of organisations (Young & Wu, 2017). Yet, this 
cooperation diminishes the favourable effects on corporate value that could result 
from intense monitoring of institutional shareholders (Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari, 
2015; Arouri et al., 2014). Based on Pound’s (1988) conflict of interest assumption, 
it is hypothesised that:
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H3: Institutional ownership is negatively associated with firm performance
CEO Duality and Firm Performance
The advocates of organisational theories suggest that duality enhances unity of 
command (Garas & ElMassah, 2018). However, the proponents of agency theory 
(Nas & Kalaycioglu, 2016; Duru et al., 2016) suggest that avoiding duality limits 
potential CEO entrenchment. Contrarily, Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) explained 
role duality through agency and stewardship theory arguing that agency problems 
arise when the same person holds two positions on the board, leading towards 
performance inefficiency and ultimately towards conflict of interest (Sheikh & 
Karim, 2015). However, CEO duality is synonymous with poor performance 
and weaker monitoring, establishes dependence, decreases board monitoring 
effectiveness, and increases CEO entrenchment (Nuanpradit, 2019). 
Despite these arguments, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) defended the agency theory 
in the context of improved efficiency, enhanced performance, and effective 
management mentoring if two positions work separately (Hassan & Habouni, 
2013). While stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997) supports this concept and 
explains that performance and efficiency enhance over time when same person 
holds two positions because it depicts clear picture of roles and responsibilities to 
the person holding two positions on the board (Sheikh & Karim, 2015). Therefore, 
based on agency theory, it is hypothesised that:
H4: CEO duality is negatively linked to firm performance
Investment on CSR and Firm Performance
Porter and Kramer (2006) stated that CSR can be a source of opportunity, 
innovation, and competitive advantage when used appropriately. Particularly, 
firms can simultaneously enhance their competitiveness in the markets and 
advance the economic and social conditions in the communities when adopting 
policies and practices aiming at creating “shared value.” Alternatively, firms 
face trade-off between social responsibility and firm performance, placing them 
in a disadvantageous cost position incurring agency costs where managers attain 
private benefits from building the reputation as good social citizen at the expense 
of shareholders (Kotchen & Moon, 2012; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Barnea & Rubin, 
2010). 
Additionally, corporate legitimacy argues that firms tend to engage in CSR activities 
to build their own personal reputation as good global tycoons (over-investment 
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hypothesis). And, it is their legitimate responsibility (Karim et al., 2019) to comply 
with the regulations of top authorities of their respective nations (Al-Malkawi & 
Javaid, 2018). In this way, investment on CSR provides ground for firms to assess 
their CSR strategies and identify the discrepancies where corporate resources are 
being misused by the managers (Karim et al., 2019a) for their private benefits. 
Based on these arguments, it is hypothesised that:
H5: Investment on CSR negatively affects firm performance 
Interaction Effect of Board Independence
The company board is constituted to reduce the cost associated with conflict 
between owners and management (Ashfaq & Rui, 2018) and taking into account 
the concerns relating to stakeholders. The shareholders main interest is to maximise 
firm value while the interest of the management is to maximise their benefits (Olson 
et al., 2018). In this situation, CG mechanisms are usually introduced to deal with 
this condition and minimise the conflict. Thus, a number of CG mechanisms 
have been proposed to ensure the effectiveness of monitoring in solving agency 
problems between management and owners and gaining stakeholders’ interests. 
Though the board delegates both management functions and decision control 
functions to internal managers, they retain final control over the managers through 
the right to ratify key operational decisions (Duru et al., 2016). As Coles et al. 
(2008) contend, complex firms should have higher board independence for better 
advice to the firm’s CEO (Karim et al., 2019b; Sheikh & Karim, 2015).
The role of the board of directors as an effective monitoring mechanism for 
management is dependent upon them being non-executive and independent. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of independent directors on corporate boards is an 
effective mechanism to reduce the potential divergence between management and 
shareholders. Several empirical researches include board independence to explore 
the moderating impact on the respective relationships with mixed results (Wu & 
Wu, 2014; Duru et al., 2016). These studies argue that interest of independent 
directors is linked with lower-risk investment decisions. Contrarily, it is also 
claimed that excessive involvement of independent directors in the daily affairs of 
organisations may restrict the managers to perform their functions liberally. Thus, 
it is hypothesised that: 
H6: Board independence negatively moderates the relationship between 
CG mechanisms, CSR practice and firm performance 




This study used the data of Malaysian non-financial companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia for the period 2006–2017. The data were mainly extracted from 
annual reports of firms; however, datastream is used for obtaining data relevant 
to performance variables such as ROA and Tobin’s Q. Unbalance panel data 
is employed for the study due to unavailability of annual reports of few listed 
companies. Data of financial companies have been excluded from the dataset due 
to the different nature of business of these firms. Therefore, final sample consists 
of 5501 firm-year observations of 588 listed firms in Malaysia during 2006–2017. 
The reason for choosing Malaysian listed firms is that Malaysia is an emerging 
economy which suffered several economic twists and turns since its birth. Despite 
these ups and downs, the country has successfully maintained its reputation in the 
corporate world. Additionally, the time period of 2006–2017 is chosen because 
more than 10 years of panel data are considered sufficient for econometric analysis 
and estimation process. 
This study aims to investigate the influence of CG and CSR on firm performance 
where CG attributes chosen for the study are ownership concentration, managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership, and CEO duality whereas the CSR measure 
adopted in the study is investment on CSR. Ehsan and Kaleem (2012) used 
the measure of CSR as investment on CSR where investment on CSR denotes 
“Donations + Workers’ Welfare Fund/Earnings before Tax.” However, this study 
uses donations, sponsorships, scholarships, and investment on welfare programs 
is set as a measure of investment on CSR in Malaysian context. Moreover, this 
study also examines the moderating role of board independence on the relationship 
between CG mechanisms, CSR practice, and firm performance. However, two 
control variables, i.e., firm size and leverage are employed to control for firm-
specific characteristics. Table 1 presents the operational definition and measurement 
of variables utilised in the study. 
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Table 1
Operational definition and measurement of variables
Variables Proxy Definition
Dependent variables
Return on assets ROAit Net income to total assets.
Tobin’s Q TQit Market value of equity added to the book value of 
the debt over the book value of the total assets.
Independent variables
Ownership concentration OWNCit Shares held by 5–10 largest shareholders to 
outstanding common shares.
Managerial ownership MOWNit Shares held by managers to total outstanding 
common shares.
Institutional ownership IOWNit Shares held by institutions to total outstanding 
common shares.
CEO duality CEODit A dummy variable, 1 if CEO is the chairman of the 
board and 0 otherwise.
Investment on CSR ICSRit A dummy variable, 1 if investment on CSR 
available and 0 otherwise.
Moderating variable
Board independence BINDit Proportion of independent directors to total number 
of board directors.
Control variables
Firm size SIZEit Natural logarithm of total assets.
Leverage LEVit Total liabilities to total assets. 
Research Framework
Figure 1 presents the research framework of the study for better illustration of 
variables and their relationship. 
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Figure 1. Research framework
METHODOLOGY
This study employs a dynamic system of GMM for estimations and analyses of 
data. Since static estimations are considered incompetent for explaining coherent 
results of variables, the dynamic model using system GMM produces reliable 
and accurate results (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Arellano & Bond, 1991). The 
main problem is that quite frequently a firm’s variables are endogenously related 
with dependent variables (Arellano & Bover, 1995). Cross-sectional data do 
not allow for correction of unobservable heterogeneity. When unobserved firm 
characteristics are correlated with exogenous variables, estimated coefficients will 
be biased (Bond, 2002). An initial solution to the endogeneity problem is to use 
panel data. Estimating fixed-effect models or models in differences is an efficient 
solution. However, it is only workable when the unobservable characteristics are 
time-variant. For CG-CSR, it is quite complicated to know which firm-specific 
courses of action enhance firm performance. In the current study, the sample may 
contain firm’s unobserved characteristics that could be time varying and fixed-
effect model is insufficient to eliminate spurious relationships between CG-CSR 
and firm performance. Subsequently, more model structure is required to improve 
understanding of how CG-CSR impact firm performance. As a solution, the study 
followed Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) using dynamic 
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panel data model approach with lagged endogenous variables as instruments, 
provided they met the conditions for valid instruments.  
Dynamic models are specified with lagged dependent variables and control 
for unobserved heterogeneity, reverse causality, simultaneity, and dynamic 
endogeneity. Furthermore, dynamic models basically concentrate on single 
equation and autoregressive distributive lag models where large number of cross-
section units and small number of time periods bring consistent outcomes (Bond, 
2002). Therefore, regression models for this study are as follows:
ROA OWNC MOWN IOWN CEOD
ICSR SIZE LEV ROA
it it it it it
it it it it it
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 1
b b b b b
b b b b f
= + + + + +
+ + + +-
 (1)
TQ OWNC MOWN IOWN CEOD
ICSR SIZE LEV TQ
it it it it it
it it it it it
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 1
b b b b b
b b b b f
= + + + + +
+ + + +-
 (2)
However, for investigating the moderating role of board independence on the 
relationship between CG mechanisms, CSR practice and firm performance, the 
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In the equations, ROAit is return on assets and TQit is Tobin’s Q for ith company 
at time t. OWNCit, MOWNit and IOWNit are ownership concentration, managerial 
ownership, and institutional ownership for ith company at time t, respectively. 
Moreover, CEODit and ICSRit are CEO duality and investment on CSR for ith 
company at time t, respectively. SIZEit and LEVit denote control variables namely 
firm size and leverage for ith company at time t, respectively. Equations 3 and 4 
exhibit the interaction terms for CG mechanisms, CSR practice, and performance 
relationship and board independence. ROAit–1 and TQit–1 are one year lagged 
values of return on assets and Tobin’s Q. Additionally, β0 is the intercept, εit is 
the random error term for ith company at time t. β1–β7 are the coefficients of 
concerned explanatory and control variables.
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables of the study where mean 
value of return on assets (ROAit) is 0.004 indicating that, on average, firms are 
losing 0.004 cents profit for RM1 of total assets. The mean value of Tobin’s Q is 
1.26 which indicates the proportion of market value to the book value of company’s 
total assets. Ownership concentration shows the mean value of 51.14%, suggesting 
that ownership of Malaysian listed companies is 51.14% concentrated. Moreover, 
12.78% shares are held by managers and their spouses, whereas institutional 
ownership is 34.56% in Malaysia. CEO duality depicts the mean value of 8.01% 
indicating that only 8.01% firms have their CEOs as chairmen of the company. 
Moreover, investment on CSR shows the average value of 71.27% indicating that 
more than 70% of Malaysian firms invest on CSR activities. Additionally, firm 
size indicates the mean value of 12.96 and leverage shows 41.67% presenting the 
financing pattern of Malaysian Listed Companies.
Table 2  
Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
ROAit 5501 –0.0040 1.5541 –48.226 10.756
TQit 5501 1.2610 2.3051 –6.95 34.38
OWNCit 5501 0.5114 0.3283 0.0520 5.0766
MOWNit 5501 0.1278 0.1732 0 0.7400
IOWNit 5501 0.3456 0.1805 0.0077 1.7145
CEODit 5501 0.0801 0.2715 0 1
ICSRit 5501 0.7127 0.4525 0 1
SIZEit 5501 12.964 1.5580 7.6797 18.521
LEVit 5501 0.4167 0.4067 0.0010 10.319
Correspondingly, Table 3 depicts the correlation matrix of dependent and 
independent variables where the figures illustrate fairly small values pointing no 
element of multicollinearity among the variables. 
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Multicollinearity Test using Variance Inflation Factor 
Variance inflation factor (VIF) test was carried out to determine whether there 
exists high collinearity between the independent variables or not. In other words, 
whether two or more variables are measuring the same thing or variables are 
independent of one another. Hair et al. (2010) suggested that VIF of less than 10 
would indicate no serious multicollinearity problem amongst the paired variables. 
Hair et al. (2010) stated that one of the various methods to check for the existence 
of the correlation among independent variables is through multicollinearity test 
that explains the level by which one variable’s effect could be managed by the 
other variable. However, variance inflation factor is the technique to check for 
multicollinearity. For the dataset of current study, no problem of multicollinearity 
existed after running regressions on the dataset as depicted in Table 4.
Table 4 
Multicollinearity test using VIF
Variables VIF (ROAit) 1/VIF (ROAit) VIF (TQit) 1/VIF(TQit)
OWNCit 1.03 0.270 1.25 0.302
MOWNit 2.01 0.498 2.63 0.265
IOWNit 1.98 0.505 1.98 0.526
CEODit 3.06 0.268 2.01 0.542
ICSRit 2.78 0.322 3.06 0.230
SIZEit 2.34 0.359 2.34 0.425
LEVit 1.15 0.427 1.21 0.412
Mean VIF 2.05 0.372 2.06 0.384
Heteroskedasticity Test
The following hypothesis was tested to ascertain the variance consistency of the 
random error through Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
where alternate hypothesis predicts constant variance of regression model. After 
running the regressions, the results of the heteroskedasticity tests indicate that 
the probability values of chi-square for each regression are far greater than 5% 
rejection region as shown in Table 5.





Chi2 (1) 0.02 0.04
Prob > Chi2 0.8759 0.7452
System GMM Regression Results
As stated earlier, this study employs dynamic modeling for estimation process of 
the dataset as system GMM gives accurate and precise results. Table 6 exhibits 
the regression results of the impact of CG mechanisms and CSR practice on return 
on assets. However, in system GMM, one year lagged value of return on assets is 
used. The findings reveal that ownership concentration and managerial ownership 
are negatively linked with ROAit–1 but the relationship is significant with ownership 
concentration. Institutional ownership and CEO duality are positively related with 
ROAit–1 but significant relationship is observed between CEO duality and ROAit–1. 
Furthermore, investment on CSR negatively and significantly affects ROAit–1. For 
control variables, firm size is positively significant and leverage is negatively 
significant with ROAit–1. Consequently, this study used Sargan test for over-
identification problem and Arellano-Bond test for the problem of autocorrelation. 
The values of both tests are greater than 0.05 (95% significance level) leaving no 
cause for over-identification and autocorrelation problem. 
Table 7 gives the results relating the impact of CG attributes and CSR practice on 
Tobin’s Q. Findings indicate ownership concentration and institutional ownership 
are positively related, whereas managerial ownership and CEO duality are 
negatively related to market based performance measure. However, the relationship 
is only significant with CEO duality. Furthermore, the investment on CSR is also 
negative and significantly associated with TQit–1. Concerning control variables, 
firm size is positively insignificant whereas leverage is negatively significant 
with TQit–1. Besides, the values of Sargan test and Arellano-Bond test indicate 
reasonably greater values than 0.05 showing no problem of over-identification and 
autocorrelation. 
Additionally, this study also examines the moderating role of board independence 
on CG mechanisms, CSR practice, and performance relationship. Table 8 depicts 
regression results of the moderating role of board independence of the given 
relationship. As indicated in the table, the majority of the variables showed 
significant negative relationships with board independence as moderator. Thus, it is 
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suggested that board independence negatively moderates the relationship between 
CG attributes, CSR practice and firm performance in Malaysian listed companies.
In sum, ownership concentration is negatively related to return on assets; CEO 
duality positively affects ROAit–1 whereas negatively affects TQit–1. Moreover, 
investment on CSR is negatively linked to both performance measures. Firm size 
is positively associated with return on assets and leverage is negatively linked 
with both performance measures. Additionally, board independence negatively 
moderates the relationship between CG attributes, CSR practice and firm 
performance. 
Table 6
Effects of explanatory variables on return on assets (ROAit–1) using GMM
Variable Coefficients Std. err. z-statistic Probability
C –0.8157 0.5015 –1.63 0.104
OWNCit –0.7460 0.3583 –2.08 0.037
MOWNit –0.5914 0.4307 –1.37 0.170
IOWNit 0.1763 0.4251 0.41 0.678
CEODit 0.6689 0.2333 2.87 0.004
ICSRit –0.0402 0.0185 –2.17 0.030
SIZEit 0.1502 0.0264 5.68 0.000
LEVit –1.9202 0.0929 –20.65 0.000
L1 –0.0127 0.0039 –3.26 0.001
Sargan test for over-identifying restriction: p value 0.0872
Arellano-Bond test for 1st order 0.2534
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Table 7
Effects of explanatory variables on Tobin’s Q (TQit–1) using GMM
Variable Coefficients Std. err. z-statistic Probability
C –0.4421 1.0275 –0.43 0.667
OWNCit 0.3918 0.5019 0.78 0.435
MOWNit –1.0308 0.7562 –1.36 0.173
IOWNit 0.4142 0.4672 0.89 0.375
CEODit –0.4377 0.2168 –2.02 0.044
ICSRit –0.0762 0.0387 –1.97 0.049
SIZEit 0.0803 0.0759 1.06 0.290
LEVit –0.0835 0.0371 –2.25 0.024
L1 0.2891 0.0189 15.29 0.000
Sargan test for over-identifying restriction: p value 0.0952
Arellano-Bond test for 1st order 0.1079
Table 8
Moderating effect of BINDit on CG mechanisms, CSR practice, and firm performance
Variable ROAit TQit
C –1.3033*** –0.5103**
OWNCit * BINDit –1.5651*** –1.7413***
MOWNit * BINDit –0.0991 –0.0386
IOWNit * BINDit –1.6969*** –1.4534***
CEODit * BINDit –0.4956*** –0.0152**
ICSRit * BINDit –0.0282* –0.3043**
R2 0.1150 0.2735
Adjusted R2 0.1360 0.2547
Root MSE 1.5436 1.2758
Note: Significant at ***1%, **5% and *10% levels
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DISCUSSION 
The aims of this study are to assess the impacts of CG mechanisms and CSR 
practice on firm performance and to examine the moderating role of board 
independence on the given relationship. The regression results indicate that 
ownership concentration is negatively affecting ROAit–1 whereas it does not affect 
TQit–1. The negative relationship confirms the prediction of agency theory which 
contends that top managers, acting as agents of stockholders, can pursue courses of 
action that may not be parallel to the interests of the owners (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Moreover, it is the prospective cause of conflict of interest between major 
and minor shareholders that brings costs to the firm when block holders tend to 
maximise value for their own interests and divest minor owners on their part of the 
left over returns (La Porta et al., 2000). This finding is consistent with the findings 
of Sheikh and Karim (2015).
Correspondingly, CEO duality is positively related to lag value of return on assets 
and negatively associated with lagged Tobin’s Q value. This finding inculcates that 
CEO duality is beneficial for internal affairs of the company because it depicts a clear 
picture of roles and responsibilities to the person holding two positions, confirming 
the prophecy of Stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997). Alternatively, CEO duality 
is negatively associated with market based performance measure, confirming the 
predictions of agency theory, contending CEO duality enhances agency problems 
that ultimately lead firms towards conflict of interest. Furthermore, role duality and 
its substantial negative impact on market return are responsible for minimising the 
market value of firms in Malaysia. However, the positive result is consistent with 
the studies of Sheikh and Karim (2015) and the negative relationship is consistent 
with Duru et al. (2016), and Hassan and Halbouni (2013).
Concerning the CSR practice, i.e., investment on CSR and its effect on firm 
performance indicates the negative relationship with both performance measures. 
The probable explanation for this relationship is that firms face trade-off between 
social responsibility and firm performance, placing them in a disadvantageous 
cost position incurring agency costs where managers attain private benefits from 
building the reputation as good social citizen at the expense of shareholders (Barnea 
& Rubin, 2010). Therefore, CSR have value-decreasing impact in the face of high 
level managerial entrenchment where managers overinvest in CSR activities for 
their personal benefits to camouflage their corporate misconduct (Kotchen & 
Moon, 2012; Harjoto & Jo, 2011). It indicates that managers of Malaysian firms 
overinvest in the CSR activities in order to hide their financial misconduct, thus 
creating agency costs for firms and negatively affecting firm performance. 
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Furthermore, board independence negatively moderates the significant relationship 
between CG mechanisms, CSR practice, and firm performance. This outcome 
confirms the predictions of agency theory where higher outsider representation is 
the prospective cause of conflict of interest between shareholders and management. 
However, this result suggests that excessive involvement of the independent 
directors in the daily affairs of organisations may restrict the managers to perform 
their functions liberally, hence negatively moderating the relationship. However, 
this finding is analogous to the finding of Wu and Wu (2014). 
Findings related to control variables suggest a positive relationship between firm 
size and ROAit–1 due to scale economies where organisations get resources at lower 
cost but at greater diversification. However, the finding is parallel to the results 
of Hassan and Halbouni (2013) and Ofoeda (2017). Alternatively, the negative 
relationship between leverage and firm performance suggests that agency issues 
are the potential cause of firms to use higher levels of debt, limiting managers to 
perform firm’s operations effectively, thus negatively affecting the performance. 
Conversely, the negative relationship is in congruence with Mishra and Kapil 
(2017).
CONCLUSION
Conclusively, this study attempts to investigate the joint impacts of CG mechanisms 
and CSR practice on firm performance and to examine the moderating role of board 
independence of the given relationship. Findings of the study provide significant 
insights for regulatory bodies of Malaysia such as Securities Commission (SC) 
Malaysia and Bursa Malaysia. SC Malaysia is continuously striving for better CG 
mechanisms over the period of 18 years by providing continuous amendments in 
CG codes. It is prime responsibility of SC Malaysia to oversee the compliance 
of the code by listed firms in Malaysia. As far as findings related to ownership 
structure are concerned, SC Malaysia needs to incorporate the specifications of 
ownership structure in the code as such there is no amendment provided to the 
listed companies by the SC Malaysia. For policy makers, the study necessitates 
that they must shift their ownership patterns from concentrated to dispersed for 
ensuring effective CG in their firms. 
Accordingly, it must be monitored regularly by the top management of the firms 
whether the corporate resources are being utilised for socially responsible projects 
or they are being misused by the managers for their private benefits and personal 
motives. Furthermore, the negative interaction effect of board independence 
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inculcates that SC Malaysia must revisit the requirement of 50% independent 
boards for ensuring better monitoring role by the outsiders. 
For academia, the study obtains support from agency theory and legitimacy theory 
for explaining the majority of the relationships. In addition, several hypotheses have 
also been discussed to explain the relationships between CG-CSR and performance. 
However, there are certain limitations of the study as well. For instance, the study 
considers the data of only one country. For ensuring generalisability of research, 
the same research can be applied to other emerging and developed economies. 
Moreover, the study included few CG mechanisms and CSR practice and for 
future research, other significant governance and CSR variables can be included. 
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